The collection is composed of documents regarding the JPL Executive Council Retreats from 1978 to 1991. Included in the collection are agendas, memoranda, reports, presentation material, and handwritten notes. The files appear to have been collected by the Office of the Associate Director for Institutional Programs. Holding that position during this time were Fred H. Felberg (1981-87), Clarence R. "Johnny" Gates (1987-90), and Duane F. Dipprey (1991-93). The information presented in the materials illustrated not only the accomplishments of JPL, but also the various interactions between JPL, NASA, Congress and Caltech. Most of the documentation for each Retreat before 1982 is located in single folders, consisting of handwritten notes and correspondence. Beginning in 1982, the amount of documentation in the form of handouts and presentation material began to become more copious. By 1986, most of the information documented in the collection is presentation materials. The first retreat documented in the collection, held in La Jolla in December 1978, included Noel W. Hinners, NASA Associate Administrator for the Office of Space Science (OSS) in attendance. The handwritten notes, presumably taken by Felberg, revealed numerous items. The interaction between JPL and NASA Headquarters was examined. NASA HQ had the impression that JPL project people were nervous towards the end of the project, reflecting the talent depth problem and the absence of position assignment continuity in going from pre-project to project phase. JPL presentations at HQ were not regarded as being very sharp. To NASA HQ, JPL's attitude often seemed cavalier and arrogant. Hinners also reported that Murray personally tended to intimidate some people at top levels of NASA, especially Deputy Administrator Alan Lovelace. William Bayley reported that Lovelace's office felt that JPL often acted like they owned NASA, when the opposite was the fact. JPL also seemed to be out of control, due to the distance and attitude of leadership. The perception was also apparent that JPL leaders gave no indication that they respected HQ people. This interaction with Hinners proved so valuable to JPL that the next Executive Council retreat, in November 1979, was a joint one with OSS, held at Airlie, VA. Beginning in the late 1970s, as it became clear that the amount of support for planetary exploration were dwindling, JPL started to look elsewhere for future projects. Included in materials from the January 5-6, 1980 Retreat are a draft report entitled "The Future of Utilitarian, Non-Space, Civilian Activities at JPL," dated January 3, 1980, and a rough draft by JPL's Technology and Space Program Development entitled "The Outlook for JPL in Utilitarian Space Activities." The February 5-6, 1982 Retreat was one of urgency. There was increased pressure for JPL to obtain Department of Defense (DOD) work. In a January 18, 1982 memo from the Management Committee to Bruce Murray, it was reported that feedback was given by JPL personnel that the Caltech and JPL top management would "fiddle around" for the next year until the roof caved in. The Management Committee reported that the only really urgent matter worthy of Executive Council Retreat focus was identifying the best strategy for achieving rapid growth of DOD business. JPL should identify its strengths and aspirations relevant to the DOD market, identify characteristics of the DOD market, and formulate a basic strategy for rapid development of the JPL DOD program. Included in background material for the February 1982 Retreat are documents identified by Murray as material supporting major policy discussions made during 1981. The most important issue was possible DOD tasks for JPL. A draft discussion paper dated October 16, 1981 noted that the proposed federal budget cuts had created a "crisis condition" at JPL. There was some anticipation of a temporarily lower space exploration program level through the early 1980s, but this decline continued throughout 1981, with the cancellation of the U.S. spacecraft portion of the International Solar Polar Mission, the failure of the U.S. Halley Comet Intercept Mission, and the slippage of a start on a Venus Orbiting Radar Mission to at least FY'84. Exacerbating the institutional impact was significant cuts in funding for Department of Energy solar energy programs, which were in danger of being cut entirely. Additional cuts to NASA were also proposed. NASA's priorities rested with the Shuttle program, and Murray noted that NASA had protrayed JPL as their most expendable Center carrying out their most expendable program to the Office of Management and Budget. Murray concluded by noting "for the first time the possibility of actual contract cancellation and the dissolution of JPL as an entity cannot be discounted." A February 4, 1982 interoffice memorandum from Jack James to the Executive Council made several observations on Defense Programs obstacles. James noted the external obstacles included elements of the DOD not knowing what JPL was, JPL's image, and the different cultures between DOD and JPL. Internal obstacles were the JPL proposal process and the JPL organization. James additionally made the observation that the transition from random acquisitions of DOD projects to a more stable base would take years, not months. The April 10, 1984 EC Retreat addressed the question of JPL doing the Mariner Mark II Project in a subsystem mode (JPL integration and test of the spacecraft) versus system mode (integration and test as a system contractor.) In a March 23, 1984 report, it was speculated that unless the Mariner Mark II project be approved as an in-house subsystem contract mode project, the JPL capability in planetary power systems skills would be virtually wiped out. JPL wanted a very knowledgeable, high-quality technical capability, but would have a difficult time hiring top-quality engineers without top-quality technical job opportunities. It was also noted in an April 6, 1984 memorandum that potential system contractors generally would be not as familiar with many of the new technologies, and a subsystem approach to the project would be the most cost effective and lowest risk. There was a special Executive Council Retreat on Workforce Planning, held on May 15, 1984. Included in the collection are reports written by Felberg, Gates, Giberson, and others regarding workforce planning of virtually every JPL office. Beginning with the March 1986 Retreat, the documents in the collection more heavily represent presentation materials than correspondence and notes on the meetings themselves. The March 1986 Retreat was held around two months after the Challenger disaster. In a survey of JPL constituents it was discovered that JPL had generally a positive reputation among nearly everyone. There were some negative comments at NASA field centers that were in competition with JPL over various projects, but aside from that, JPL rated well with all the groups polled: the aerospace industry, the general community, the Congress, DOD customers, academics, and the news media. JPL seemed to be the one NASA unit that had the best reputation after the Challenger explosion. Included in the presentation material in the 1986 Retreat materials is a report by Jack James, "JPL's Product Lines." This report examined the major changes to JPL in 1958-59, the last era of great transition at JPL, and examined changes made during the 1960s in business, organization, application of technical work force, and product line capability trends. The objective of the April 1987 retreat was to identify the primary mission components and key institutional characteristics toward which JPL should aim in the 1993 to 2000 timeframe, with strategies for reaching them. Included in the presentation materials is an assessment of the short and long-term priorities and programs of NASA. The two priority programs of NASA were the Space Shuttle and the Space Station. All other NASA interests or activities, such as a High-Lift Launch Vehicle, were examined in the context of the environment produced by the two priority programs. The NASA payload demand for the Shuttle greatly exceeded the planned launch capability through 1995, producing a demoralizing atmosphere of long, expensive delays with programs at a standstill. Funding for the Space Station Program might have to be increased, with a potential political cost against other programs. Additionally, it was noted that once underway, the Station would be a hungry program strongly competing for NASA resources, both funding and launch capability, through the 1990s. Despite such grim prognostications, Donald G. Rea made a presentation at the retreat giving prospective flight project opportunities. These included Cassini, Mainbelt Asteroid Rendezvous, Lunar Geoscience Observer, Near Earth Asteroid Rendezvous, Mars Aeronomy Observer, and the Environmental Observation Satellite (EOS) Project. The April 1988 Executive Council Retreat materials include a presentation, "Opportunities and Strategy for the 90s," by Charles Elachi. It was noted that by the early 90s, orbiters for all the near planets and to a comet, would be in route or under development. The next phase of exploration would mainly involve in-depth studies of Venus, Mars, and small bodies in preparation for long term landers/rovers/sample return missions. Elachi noted that except for a Mars Rover Sample Return mission, the missions would have a hard time capturing the public's imagination in the same way as past missions. EOS was projected as an ambitious project, with the most sophisticated instruments ever used and the most advanced data handling systems. Having a role in EOS gave JPL the potential of being the center for exploration and study of the total solar system, and would make JPL the center of public attention of all high visibility missions of the 1990s. Also included in the materials for the 1988 Retreat was a presentation made a month earlier by Donald G. Rea at NASA Headquarters on the Mars Rover Sample Return (MRSR) mission. Eight options were explored, with launch options of 1997, 1999 or 2001. The evolution of many JPL projects can be noted in the collection. In the 1988 Retreat, it was noted that JPL was not actively seeking the Space Infrared Telescope Facility (SIRTF) Project, that Ames and several other NASA Centers were competing for it, and Lew Allen did not want a confrontation with Ames, although JPL would take the mission if asked to. At the 1989 Retreat, Office of Space Science and Applications Associate Administrator Lennard Fisk asked JPL, Ames Research Center, Marshall Space Flight Center and Goddard Space Flight Center to make proposals for SIRTF. JPL personnel believed that receiving the assignment was a low probability, and Allen did not propose to mount a major sales campaign. The 1990 Retreat was in marked contrast, as apparently to JPL's surprise, SIRTF was assigned to JPL. CRAF/Cassini also was assigned to the Lab at this time. The 1991 Retreat, held April 4-7, 1991, was the first to bring up the business strategy of "Total Quality Management" (TQM). JPL's objective in engaging TQM was a continuous improvement of the quality of all products and services while containing and reducing cost. JPL Discreet materials 20 folders contain documents that are stamped or marked "JPL Discreet" or "SEB Discreet." The original positions of Discreet material in the collection have been marked with separation sheets. The material has been moved to a box at the end of the collection.
